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Article: 
The articles in this collection consider one very interesting puzzle of development: U-shaped developmental 
functions. At some point during development, an organism might exhibit what seems like a regression from its 
expected developmental trajectory and, according to continuity models of development, this is aberrant. In this 
special issue, apparent regressions in behavior across a wide range of developmental phenomena are discussed. 
Gershkoff-Stowe and Thelen (this issue) present evidence that infants will reach correctly on B trials before 
they reach perseveratively, and that young children's naming errors actually increase with age before achieving 
a period of stability. Namy, Campbell. and Tomasello (this issue) show that even though 26-month-olds have 
difficulty with arbitrary gestures, younger and older children do not. Finally, Cashon and Cohen (this issue) 
show that the ability to integrate facial features follows a U-shaped developmental pattern for inverted faces. 
but oddly enough. an N-shaped pattern for upright faces. These counter-intuitive findings, and many others like 
them, seem to call for revisions to the common theoretical conception of development as a monotonically in-
creasing. ever-improving process. In line with the contributors, our main thesis is that regressions in the 
developmental trajectory of particular behavioral traits are, if anything. the quintessential hallmark of the 
developmental process rather than mere artifacts of development. 
 
The main premise of our thesis is based upon a rejection of the old idea that development is a continuous 
process whose endpoint defines everything that comes before it. This kind of adultomorphic perspective forces 
one to view earlier behaviors and functions as immature versions of the adult functions. The articles in this issue 
provide several examples of this kind of "old" thinking. For example, the ability of a 5-month-old to reach 
"correctly" on a B trial has been interpreted as the consequence of immature reaching abilities as compared to 
older children and adults (Gershkoff-Stowe & Thelen, this issue). Likewise, 18-month-olds' propensity to 
properly learn an arbitrary gesture presumably reflects an immaturity of symbolic awareness (Namy et al.. this 
issue). Finally, 4-month-olds' ability to process faces in an integrative manner is supposedly immature because 
it may be unstable and limited in capacity (Cashon & Cohen, this issue). 
 
We believe that this kind of thinking is wrong-headed mainly because it leads one away from understanding the 
very processes that underlie development. As so ably described by Gershkoff-Stowe and Thelen (this issue), 
development is a complex and dynamic process characterized by structural and functional re-organization 
resulting in non-linear and emergent outcomes. We fully agree with this characterization of development and 
believe that U-shaped trajectories are an essential feature of development. In our view, however, the dynamical 
systems approach is conceptually incomplete when it comes to interpreting the essential rather than artifactual 
role that U-shaped developmental trajectories play in ontogenesis. On the one hand, the dynamical systems 
approach provides a useful heuristic for thinking about the proximal causes of developmental change. It holds 
that the proximal causes of instability are growth. experience, and the asynchronous development of sub-
systems. For example, as the child grows, new sensory, perceptual. cognitive, and motor abilities emerge that 
then provide the child with new opportunities for further development. Often, however, re-integration of sub-
systems to achieve a new state of organization requires that the organism pass through states of disorganization, 
or what appear to be less mature forms of behavior. 
 
A particularly good example of the re-integration of sub-systems following a period of disorganization is 
illustrated by the classic finding of young children's overregularization of the past tense (e.g., Bybee & Slobin, 
1982; Ervin & Miller, 1963). Although young children arc initially correct when producing the past tense of 
irregular verbs (e.g.. ring —> rang), subsequently they go through a period where they overregularized (e.g.. 
ring —> ringed). In the final stage. they begin to systematically use the correct past tense again. One popular 
explanation is that children produce past tense forms based on two processes: memorization and rule following. 
Initially, children rely mostly on memorization, which leads to correct usage of the past tense. The tendency to 
overregularize the newly learned "add -ed" rule overrides the previously learned behaviors and leads to an 
increase in errors. Eventually. children are capable of integrating both processes. and successfully add —ed to 
the regular verbs while memorizing the proper past tense for the irregular verbs (Bybee & 1982: but see 
Rumelhart & McClelland. 1986, for an alternative perspective). 
 
Although the dynamical systems view offers a sensible explanation for the proximal causes of developmental 
re-organization, we believe that this is only a part of the story. In our view. the U-shaped character of 
development also may reflect the influence of distal (i.e., evolutionary) influences. To understand how distal 
influences might contribute to U-shaped developmental trajectories. it is useful to consider the concept of 
ontogenetic adaptations proposed by Oppenheim (1981). This concept holds that at any particular time in 
development an organism is well-adapted to its current environmental context. According to an epigenetic 
systems view of development (Gottlieb, 1992). the organism achieves this state of adaptation by a process of 
structural and functional reorganization that consists of the complex. bi-directional co-action of factors internal 
and external to the organism at all levels of organization, from molecular. through cellular, to organismic. 
Importantly. this re-organization takes into account not only the organism's contemporary exigencies but past 
ones as well (i.e., early experience). During times of homeostasis and stability (what are termed attractor states 
in dynamical systems theory). the organism functions perfectly well vis-a-vis its milieu. 
 
Oppenheim illustrates this point by describing the metamorphosis of a tadpole into a frog. Both organisms are 
well-adapted to their milieu: the tadpole is well-adapted to its aquatic environment and to the need to breathe in 
water and the frog is well-adapted to its terrestrial existence and to its need to breathe in air. Although the 
metamorphosis from a tadpole to a frog is an extreme example of developmental reorganization and ontogenetic 
adaptation, Oppenheim (1981) argued that these same principles hold for other species. Indeed, two examples 
from human development come to mind. One is an example of ontogenetic adaptations that Lewkowicz and 
Turkewitz (1980) have provided from their investigation of intersensory perception in the human neonate. They 
found that neonates respond spontaneously to the intensity-based equivalence of auditory and visual inputs 
whereas adults do not. What makes these findings of particular relevance to the concept of ontogenetic 
adaptations is that even though neonates exhibit a nascent form of intersensory integration, they cannot make 
other, higher-level types of intersensory matches (Lewkowicz. 2000). In contrast, older children and adults are 
obviously capable of all types of intersensory integration. Lewkowicz and Turkewitz argued that the ability to 
perceive intensity-based intersensory equivalence provides a neonate an adaptively meaningful way to begin to 
learn about the perceptual unity of his or her world in a "buffered" and measured way. In other words, the 
neonate is not viewed as an organism that is severely limited by its sensory immaturity and limitations. Rather, 
the neonate and its limitations are seen as an ontogenetic adaptation that permits development to proceed in an 
orderly and measured way (Turkewitz & Kenny. I9821. The neonate is not an immature version of an adult hut 
a different organism whose functions are governed by different but equally well-adapted mechanisms 
(Schneirla, 1949). 
 
The second example comes from children's use of the past-tense (see above). Like the tadpole, young children 
who correctly use the appropriate past-tense are well-adapted given their developmental history and current 
milieu. Then, just like the tadpole sprouts legs and wobbles about clumsily as it begins to adapt to its new 
developmental stage, children first show an increase in errors as the past tense rules are used and 
overregularized but then, like the well-adapted frog, children learn to integrate previous experience with current 
knowledge and begin to show appropriate use of the past-tense rule. 
It should be noted, however, that by itself the concept of ontogenetic adaptations poses a theoretical problem 
because it suggests that an organism has no reason to change or improve. After all, change is the sine qua not of 
development. The solution to this problem resides in the fact that the developmental manifold consists of a 
nexus of biologically and environmentally driven changes occurring in concert with one another, and thus the 
developing organism constantly finds itself in a milieu that always offers new opportunities and challenges. A 
developing organism that takes advantage of such opportunities is evolutionarily better prepared to succeed than 
one that does not. This brings us to the central point of our commentary. By incorporating Oppenheim's (1981) 
concept of ontogenetic adaptations into our thinking about development we are forced to think about not only 
the proximal causes of developmental change but distal ones as well. In our opinion, the dynamical systems 
view accounts very well for the proximal causes of developmental change: individuals soft-assemble their 
behavior based on past experience, contemporary pressures, and their functional and structural capabilities. 
What is missing, however, is an answer to the question of what determines whether a particular behavior that is 
soft-assembled is appropriate or not. Developing organisms certainly engage in a lot of misguided behaviors. It 
is our contention that what ultimately determines the appropriateness of a given behavior is its evolutionary 
adaptability within a species-specific range (Gottlieb. 1991). 
 
If the notion that evolution selects for ontogenies (Gottlieb, 1992) is accepted, then those ontogenies that 
include successful patterns of behavioral adaptation to the individual's contemporary demands are, by 
definition. evolutionarily adaptive as well. In other words, it is the organism's flexibility to re-organize when 
necessary to the changing exigencies of its functional capacities and milieu that is evolutionarily adaptive and is 
likely to be favored over ontogenies that are more rigid. In this way. what seem like developmental regressions 
actually become essential components of an ontogenetic and evolutionary developmental trajectory. In other 
words, an epigenetic systems point of view of development that incorporates the concept of ontogenetic 
adaptations not only provides ontogenetic justification to U-shaped developmental trajectories but also brings 
evolutionary considerations into the picture. 
 
In summary, current research continues to yield impressive findings of apparent behavioral regressions. These 
kinds of findings pose fundamental challenges to our theoretical conceptions of development (Lewkowicz & 
Lickliter, 2002). As the contributors to the current collection have shown and as we have argued here, it is 
necessary to shift our theoretical focus away from the phenomena themselves towards a focus on the 
mechanisms and processes underlying developmental change. In our view, such a shift will ultimately have to 




Overall. overregularization errors are uncommon, occurring in roughly 2.5% of instances where children use 
irregular forms and remaining roughly constant until middle childhood. Nonetheless, children do make 
statistically more overregularization errors than they do earlier in childhood, which justifies classifying the 
phenomenon as U-shaped (Marcus et al.. 1992). 
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